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Abstract. By definition, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes
support homomorphic decryption, and all known FHE constructions are
bootstrapped from a Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) scheme
via this technique. Additionally, when a public key is provided, cipher-
texts are also re-randomizable, e.g., by adding to them fresh encryptions
of 0. From those two operations we devise an algorithm to sanitize a
ciphertext, by making its distribution canonical. In particular, the dis-
tribution of the ciphertext does not depend on the circuit that led to it
via homomorphic evaluation, thus providing circuit privacy in the honest-
but-curious model. Unlike the previous approach based on noise flooding,
our approach does not degrade much the security/efficiency trade-off of
the underlying FHE. The technique can be applied to all lattice-based
FHE proposed so far, without substantially affecting their concrete pa-
rameters.
1 Introduction
A fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme enables the efficient and
compact public transformation of ciphertexts decrypting to plaintexts
µ1, . . . , µk, into a ciphertext decrypting to C(µ1, . . . , µk), for any circuit C
with any number k of input wires. Since Gentry’s first proposal of a can-
didate FHE scheme [Gen09a,Gen09b], plenty of FHE schemes have been
proposed (see [SV10,DGHV10,BV11a,BV11b,Bra12,GHS12,GSW13], to
name just a few).
A typical application of FHE is to offshore heavy computations on
privacy-sensitive data: a computationally limited user encrypts its data,
sends it to a distant powerful server, tells the server which operations
to perform on the encrypted data, retrieves the result and decrypts. For
this mainstream application, confidentiality, malleability and compact-
ness seem sufficient. However, for other invaluable applications of FHE,
another property, which we will call ciphertext sanitizability, has proved
central. Statistical (resp. computational) ciphertext sanitizability requires
that there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm Sanitize tak-
ing as inputs a public key pk and a ciphertext c decrypting to a plain-
text µ under the secret key sk associated to pk, such that the distri-
butions Sanitize(pk, c) and Sanitize(pk,Enc(pk, µ)) are statistically (resp.
computationally) indistinguishable, given pk and sk (here Enc refers to
the encryption algorithm). For all applications we are aware of, com-
putational ciphertext sanitizability suffices. Nevertheless, all known ap-
proaches (including ours) provide statistical ciphertext sanitizability.
Importance of ciphertext sanitizability. The ciphertext sanitiz-
ability property is closely related to the concept of (honest-but-curious)
circuit privacy. The latter was introduced in the context of FHE by Gen-
try (see [Gen09a, Chapter 2]). Ciphertext sanitizability implies that if C0
and C1 are respectively obtained by the homomorphic evaluation of cir-
cuits C0 and C1 on honestly formed public key and ciphertexts, and if
they decrypt to the same plaintext, then their distributions should be
indistinguishable. This property is convenient in the following context: a
first user wants a second user to apply a circuit on its plaintexts, but the
first user wants to retain privacy of its plaintexts, while the second user
wants to retain privacy of its circuit. A circuit private FHE with compact
ciphertexts leads to a 2-flow protocol with communication cost bounded
independently of the circuit size (this is not the case when directly us-
ing Yao’s garbled circuit). The communication cost is proportional to the
ciphertext bit-size and the number of data bits owned by the first user.
Two other potential applications of ciphertext sanitizability are men-
tioned in Section 5.
Flooding-based ciphertext sanitizability. The only known ap-
proach to realize ciphertext sanitizability, already described in [Gen09a,
Chapter 21], is via the noise flooding technique (also called noise smudg-
ing and noise drowning). The ciphertexts of existing FHE schemes all
contain a noise component, which grows (with respect to the Euclidean
norm) and whose distribution gets skewed with homomorphic evalua-
tions. Assume that at the end of the computation, its norm is below
some bound B. The noise flooding technique consists in adding a sta-
tistically independant noise with much larger standard deviation. This
may be done publicly by adding an encryption of plaintext 0 with large
noise. The mathematical property that is used to prove ciphertext saniti-
zability is that the statistical distance between the uniform distribution
over [−B′, B′] and the uniform distribution over [−B′ + c,B′ + c] for c
such that |c| ≤ B is ≤ B/B′ (see [AJL+12]). In the context of noise
flooding, the parameter B′ is taken of the order of B · 2λ, where λ refers
to the security parameter, so that the statistical distance is exponentially
small.3
The noise flooding technique results in impractical schemes. To enable
correct decryption, the scheme must tolerate much larger noise compo-
nents: up to magnitude B · 2λ instead of B, where B can be as small
as λO(1). In the case of schemes based on the Learning With Errors
problem (LWE) [Reg09], the encryption noise rate α must be set ex-
ponentially small as a function of λ, to guarantee decryption correctness.
Then, to ensure IND-CPA security against all known attacks costing 2o(λ)
operations, the LWE dimension n and modulus q must satisfy the con-
dition n log q ≥ λ3 up to poly-logarithmic factors in λ (lattice reduc-
tion algorithms [Sch87] may be used to solve LWE with parameters n,
q and α in time 2n log q/ log2 α up to polylogarithmic factors in the ex-
ponent). This impacts key sizes, ciphertext expansion, and efficiency of
encryption, decryption and homomorphic evaluation. For example, a ci-
phertext from the Brakerski-Vaikuntanathan FHE [BV11a] would have
bit-size O(n log q) = O˜(λ) if there is no need to support noise flooding,
and O(n log q) = O˜(λ3) if it is to support noise flooding. A related impact
is that the weakest hardness assumption on lattice problems allowing to
get ciphertext sanitizability via noise flooding is the quantum hardness
of standard worst case lattice problems such as SVP with approxima-
tion factors of the order of 2
√
n in dimension n (this is obtained via the
quantum reduction of [Reg09]).
Contribution. We propose a novel approach to realize the ciphertext
sanitizability property, based on successive iterations of bootstrapping. In
short, we replace the flooding strategy by a soak-spin-repeat strategy. It
allows to take much smaller parameters (both in practice and in theory)
and to rely on less aggressive hardness assumptions. In the case of LWE-
based FHE schemes such as [BV11a,BV11b,Bra12,GSW13], the proposed
scheme modification to realize ciphertext sanitizability allows to keep the
same underlying hardness assumption (up to a small constant factor in
the lattice approximation parameter) as for basic FHE without ciphertext
sanitizability, and the same parameters (up to a small constant factor).
On the downside, sanitizing a ciphertext requires successive iterations
of bootstrapping. Note that the cost of bootstrapping has been recently
decreased [AP14,DM15].
3 Note that in some works, it is only required that σ ≥ B · λω(1). These works con-
sider resistance only against polynomial-time attackers. Here we consider the more
realistic setting where attackers can have up to sub-exponential run-time 2o(λ).
FHE bootstrapping consists in encrypting an FHE ciphertext under
a second encryption layer, and removing the inner encryption layer by
homomorphically evaluating the decryption circuit. If a ciphertext c de-
crypts to a plaintext µ, bootstrapping produces a ciphertext c′ that also
decrypts to µ, as if c was decrypted to µ and then µ re-encrypted to c′.
The latter simplification is misleading, as one may think that c′ is a fresh
encryption of µ and hence that its distribution is canonical. This is incor-
rect. Homomorphic evaluation results in a ciphertext whose distribution
may depend on the plaintexts underlying the input ciphertexts. In the
context of bootstrapping, the input plaintexts are the bits of the decryp-
tion key and the bits of c. The distribution of ciphertext c′ output by
bootstrapping depends on the distribution of c.
Rather, we propose to bootstrap several times and inject some entropy
in the ciphertext between each bootstrapping step. Suppose we start with
two ciphertexts c0 and c1 decrypting to the same plaintext µ. We ran-
domize them by adding a fresh encryption of 0. After a bootstrapping
step, we obtain ciphertexts c(1)0 and c
(1)
1 decrypting to µ. By the data
processing inequality, the statistical distance between them is no greater
than before the bootstrapping. We then inject entropy in c(1)0 and c
(1)
1 to
decrease their statistical distance by a constant factor, e.g., by a factor 2:
this is achieved by adding a fresh encryption of 0. This process is iter-
ated λ times, resulting in a pair of ciphertexts decrypting to µ and whose
statistical distance is ≤ 2−λ. The process is akin to a dynamical system,
approaching to a fixed point, canonical, distribution. This technique al-
most provides a solution to a problem suggested by Gentry in [Gen09a,
page 30], stating that bootstrapping could imply circuit privacy.
It remains to explain how to realize the entropy injection step, whose
aim is to decrease the statistical distance between the two ciphertexts by
a constant factor. In the case of FHEs with a noise component, we use a
tiny flooding. We add a fresh independent noise to the noise component,
by publicly adding a fresh encryption of plaintext 0 to the ciphertext. As
opposed to traditional flooding, this noise term is not required to be huge,
as we do not aim at statistical closeness in one go. Both noise terms (the
polluted one and the fresh one) may be of the same orders of magnitude.
Comparison with other approaches. We have already mentioned
that in the case of FHE schemes based on LWE, the flooding based ap-
proach requires assuming that LWE with noise rate α = 2−λ is hard, and
hence setting n log q ≥ λ3 (up to poly-logarithmic factors in λ). The ineffi-
cacy impact can be mitigated by performing the homomorphic evaluation
of the circuit using small LWE parameters, bootstrapping the resulting
ciphertext to large LWE parameters, flooding with noise and then boot-
strapping to small parameters (or, when it is feasible, switching modulus)
before transmitting the result. This still involves one bootstrapping with
resulting LWE parameters satisfying n log q ≥ λ3. Our approach compares
favorably in terms of sanitization efficiency, as it involves λ bootstrap-
ping with parameters satisfying n log q ≥ λ (still up to polylogarithmic
factors).
In the context of (honest-but-curious) circuit privacy with communi-
cation bounded independently of the circuit size, van Dijk et al. [DGHV10,
Appendix C] suggested using an FHE scheme and, instead of sending back
the resulting ciphertext c, sending a garbling of a circuit taking as input
the secret key and decrypting c. Using Yao’s garbled circuit results in a
communication cost that is at least λ times larger than the decryption cir-
cuit, which is itself at least linear in the ciphertext bit-length. Therefore,
our approach compares favorably in terms of communication.
Related works. In [OPP14], Ostrovsky et al. study circuit privacy in
the malicious setting: circuit privacy (or ciphertext sanitizability) must
hold even if the public key and ciphertexts are not properly generated.
This is a stronger property than the one we study in the present work.
Ostrovsky et al. combine a compact FHE and a (possibly non-compact)
homomorphic encryption scheme that enjoys circuit privacy in the ma-
licious setting, to obtain a compact FHE which is maliciously circuit
private. Their construction proceeds in two steps, and our work can be
used as an alternative to the first step.
Noise flooding is a powerful technique to obtain new functionali-
ties and security properties in lattice-based cryptography. As explained
above, however, it leads to impractical schemes. It is hence desirable to
find alternatives that allow for more efficient realizations of the same
functionalities. For example, Lyubashesvky [Lyu09] used rejection sam-
pling in the context of signatures (see also [Lyu12,DDLL13]). Alwen
et al. [AKPW13] used the lossy mode of LWE to prove hardness of
the Learning With Rounding problem (LWR) for smaller parameters
than [BPR12]. LWR is for example used to designing pseudo-random
functions [BPR12,BLMR13,BP14]. Langlois et al. [LSS14] used the Rényi
divergence as an alternative to the statistical distance to circumvent noise
flooding in encoding re-randomization for the Garg et al. cryptographic
multi-linear map candidate [GGH13].4 Further, in [BLP+13], Brakerski
et al. introduced the first-is-errorless LWE problem to prove hardness of
4 Note that the Garg et al. and hence its Langlois et al. improvement have recently
been cryptanalysed [HJ15].
the Extended LWE problem without noise flooding, hence improving over
a result from [OPW11]. They also gave a flooding-free hardness proof for
binary LWE based on the hardness of Extended LWE, hence improving a
hardness result from [GKPV10]. LWE with binary secrets was introduced
to construct a leakage resilient encryption scheme [GKPV10]. Extended
LWE was introduced to design a bi-deniable encryption scheme [OPW11],
and was also used in the context of encryption with key-dependent mes-
sage security [AP12]. The tools developed to circumvent noise flooding
seem quite diverse, and it is unclear whether a general approach could be
used.
Roadmap. In Section 2, we provide some necessary reminders. In Sec-
tion 3, we describe our ciphertext sanitation procedure. We instantiate
our approach to LWE-based FHE schemes in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
We give some background definitions and properties on Fully Homomor-
phic Encryption and probability distributions.
2.1 Fully homomorphic encryption
We let S denote the set of secret keys, P the set of public keys (which,
in our convention includes what is usually referred to as the evaluation
key), C the ciphertext space andM the message space. For simplicity, we
set M = {0, 1}. Additionally, we let Cµ denote the set of all ciphertexts
that decrypt to µ ∈M (under an implicitly fixed secret key sk ∈ S). We
also assume that every ciphertext decrypts to a message: C = ⋃µ∈M Cµ
(i.e., decryption never fails). All those sets implicitly depend on a security
parameter λ.
An FHE scheme (for S, P,M,C) is given by four polynomial time
algorithms:
• a (randomized) key generation algorithm KeyGen : {1λ} → P × S,
• a (randomized) encryption algorithm Enc : P ×M → C,
• a (deterministic) decryption algorithm Dec : S × C →M ,
• a (deterministic) homomorphic evaluation function Eval : ∀k, P ×
(Mk →M)× Ck → C.
Correctness requires that for any input circuit C with any number of
input wires k, and for any µ1, . . . , µk ∈ {0, 1}, we have (with overwhelming
probability 1− λ−ω(1) over the random coins used by the algorithms):
Dec (sk,Eval(pk, C, (c1, . . . , ck))) = C(µ1, . . . , µk),
where (pk, sk) = KeyGen(1λ) and ci = Enc(pk, µi) for all i ≤ k.
Compactness requires that elements in C can be stored on λO(1) bits.
Indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) re-
quires that given pk (where (pk, sk) = KeyGen(1λ)), the distributions
of Enc(pk, 0) and Enc(pk, 1) are computationally indistinguishable.
In addition to the above four algorithms, we define the function
Refresh(pk, c) = Eval
(
pk, CDec, (bk1, . . . , bkk, c′1, . . . , c′`)
)
,
where CDec refers to a polynomial-size circuit implementing Dec, bki =
Enc(pk, ski) for all k bits ski of secret key sk, and c′i = Enc(pk, ci) for all
` bits ci of ciphertext c. Note that Refresh is the typical bootstrapping
step of current FHE constructions.
We assume that the bki’s are given as part of pk, and do not impact
IND-CPA security of the FHE scheme. This circular security assumption
is standard in the context of FHE. We may circumvent it by using a se-
quence of key pairs (pkj , skj) and encrypting the bits of skj under pkj+1
for all j. This drastically increases the bit-size of pk and does not pro-
vide FHE per say, but only homomorphic encryption for circuits of size
bounded by any a priori known polynomial.
2.2 Properties of the statistical distance
For a probability distribution D over a countable set S, we let D(x) denote
the weight of D at x, i.e., D(x) = Pr[x˜ = x|x˜← D].
Let X and X ′ be two random variables taking values in a countable
set S. Let D and D′ be the probability distributions of X and X ′. The
statistical distance ∆(X,X ′) is defined by
∆(X,X ′) = 12
∑
x∈S
|D(x)−D′(x)|.
By abuse of notation, we aso write ∆(D,D′). Note that 0 ≤ ∆(X,X ′) ≤ 1
always holds.
Assuming that δ = ∆(X,X ′) < 1, the intersection distribution C =
D ∩ D′ is defined over S by C(x) = 11−δ min(D(x),D′(x)). It may be
checked that C is indeed a distribution (i.e.,∑x∈S C(x) = 1), by using the
following identity, holding for any reals a and b: 2min(a, b) = a+b−|a−b|.
We also define the mixture of two distributions B = α ·D+(1−α) ·D′ for
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 by B(x) = α · D(x) + (1− α) · D′(x). If X and X ′ are random
variables with distributions D and D′ respectively, then B is the density
function of the random variable obtained with the following experiment:
sample a bit from the Bernoulli distribution giving probability α to 0; if
the bit is 0, then return a sample from X; if the bit is 1, then return a
sample from X ′.
We will use the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2.1. For any δ ∈ [0, 1) and any distributions B,B′ such that
δ ≥ ∆(B,B′), there exist two distributions D and D′ such that:
B = (1− δ) · B ∩ B′ + δ · D and B′ = (1− δ) · B ∩ B′ + δ · D′.
Proof. Let C = B ∩ B′. One builds D as the renormalization to sum 1 of
the non-negative function B(x) − (1 − δ) · C(x), and proceeds similarly
for D′. uunionsq
Lemma 2.2. For any α ∈ [0, 1] and any distributions C,D,D′, we have
∆
(
(1− α) · C + α · D, (1− α) · C + α · D′) = α ·∆(D,D′).
Proof. Let B = (1− α)C + αD and B′ = (1− α)C + αD′. We derive
2 ·∆(B,B′) =
∑
|((1− α)C(x) + αD(x))− ((1− α)C(x) + αD′(x))|
=
∑
|αD(x)− αD′(x)|
= 2α ·∆(D,D′).
This completes the proof. uunionsq
The following lemma is at the core of our main result. It states that if
applying a randomized function f to any two inputs a, b ∈ S leads to two
somewhat close-by distributions, then iterating f several times provides
extremely close distributions.
Lemma 2.3. Let δ ∈ [0, 1] and f : S → S be a randomized function such
that ∆(f(a), f(b)) ≤ δ holds for all a, b ∈ S. Then:
∀k ≥ 0, ∀a, b ∈ S, ∆(fk(a), fk(b)) ≤ δk.
Proof. We prove the result by induction on k ≥ 0. It trivially holds for k =
0. We now assume that ∆(fk(a), fk(b)) ≤ δk holds for all a, b ∈ S and
some k ≥ 0, and aim at showing that ∆(fk+1(a), fk+1(b)) ≤ δk+1.
By Lemma 2.1, there exist two distributions D and D′ such that:
fk(a) = (1− δk) · fk(a) ∩ fk(b) + δk · D,
fk(b) = (1− δk) · fk(a) ∩ fk(b) + δk · D′.
By composing with f , we obtain that:
fk+1(a) = (1− δk) · f(fk(a) ∩ fk(b)) + δk · f(D),
fk+1(b) = (1− δk) · f(fk(a) ∩ fk(b)) + δk · f(D′).
Now, Lemma 2.2 implies that
∆(fk+1(a), fk+1(b)) = δk ·∆ (f(D), f(D′)) .
To complete the proof, note that
∆
(
f(D), f(D′)) = ∑
x∈S
∣∣ ∑
a′∈S
D(a′) Pr
f
[f(a′) = x]−
∑
b′∈S
D′(b′) Pr
f
[f(b′) = x]
∣∣
=
∑
x∈S
∣∣ ∑
a′,b′∈S
D(a′)D′(b′)[Pr
f
[f(a′) = x]− Pr
f
[f(b′) = x]
]∣∣
≤
∑
a′,b′∈S
D(a′)D′(b′)∣∣ ∑
x∈S
[
Pr
f
[f(a′) = x]− Pr
f
[f(b′) = x]
]∣∣.
The latter quantity is ≤ δ, by assumption. uunionsq
3 Sanitization of ciphertexts
We first formally state the correctness and security requirements of a
sanitization algorithm for an encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) with
secret key space S, public key space P , message space M and ciphertext
space C.
Definition 3.1 (Sanitization algorithm). A polynomial-time (random-
ized) algorithm Sanitize : P × C → C is said to be message-preserving
if the following holds with probability ≥ 1 − λ−ω(1) over the choice of
(pk, sk) = KeyGen(1λ):
∀c ∈ C : Dec(sk,Sanitize(pk, c)) = Dec(sk, c).
It is said (statistically) sanitizing if the following holds with probability
≥ 1− 2−λ over the choice of (pk, sk) = KeyGen(1λ): for all c, c′ ∈ C such
that Dec(sk, c) = Dec(sk, c′), we have
∆
(
Sanitize(pk, c)|(pk, sk),Sanitize(pk, c′)|(pk, sk)) ≤ 2−λ.
In what follows, we fix the key pair (pk, sk) = KeyGen(1λ) and as-
sume it is given. To simplify notations, we will omit the conditioning of
distributions Sanitize(pk, c) and Sanitize(pk, c′) by (pk, sk).
3.1 Generic algorithm
For each µ ∈M , we let C∗µ denote Refresh(pk,Cµ).5 We assume that one
may build an efficient randomized algorithm Rerand : P × C 7→ C such
that
c ∈ C∗µ ⇒ Rerand(pk, c) ∈ Cµ. (1)
We choose a cycle parameter κ > 0 as an implicit function of λ. We
now define
Wash : (pk, c) 7→ Rerand(pk,Refresh(pk, c)),
and Sanitize(pk, c) as the κ-th iteration of (pk, c) 7→ Wash(pk, c). The
following statement follows from the definitions.
Lemma 3.2 (Sanitize is message-preserving). Under assumption (1),
algorithms Wash and Sanitize are message-preserving.
In practical FHEs, implication (1) would typically only hold with
overwhelming probability 1 − λ−ω(1) over the random coins used during
key generation, encryption and execution of Rerand: guaranteeing that
those bounds always hold requires larger parameters, leading to slightly
worse practical performance. If so, the membership Sanitize(pk, c) ∈ Cµ
of Lemma 3.2 holds only with overwhelming probability. This impacts
our main result, Theorem 3.3 below, as follows: the statistical distance
bound becomes
∆
(
Sanitize(pk, c), Sanitize(pk, c′)
) ≤ δκ + κ · λ−ω(1).
Such a bound does not allow to prove that all sub-exponential attacks
can be prevented. To obtain this, one can increase the scheme parameters
a little to enable correct decryption with probability ≥ 1− 2−Ω(λ). Then
the statistical distance bound of Theorem 3.3 becomes
∆
(
Sanitize(pk, c),Sanitize(pk, c′)
) ≤ δκ + κ · 2−Ω(λ),
hence providing security against all sub-exponential attackers.
5 To give intuition, note that in our LWE instantiation, the set C∗µ will correspond to
low-noise ciphertexts decrypting to µ.
3.2 Security
Note that the trivial case Cµ = C∗µ and Rerand(pk, ·) = Id with Refresh
replaced by the identity map fits our assumptions, but is exactly the possi-
bly non-sanitized initial scheme. For security, we require that Rerand(pk, c)
does introduce some ambiguity about c, but unlike the previous flooding-
based techniques, we do not require that it completely updates the dis-
tribution of c. More precisely:
Theorem 3.3 (Sanitization security). Assume that (1) holds, and
that
∀µ ∈M,∀c, c′ ∈ C∗µ, ∆
(
Rerand(pk, c),Rerand(pk, c′)
) ≤ δ
for some constant δ ∈ [0, 1]. Then
∆
(
Sanitize(pk, c), Sanitize(pk, c′)
) ≤ δκ.
In particular if δκ ≤ 2−λ, then Sanitize is statistically sanitizing.
Proof. The result is obtained by applying Lemma 2.3, with S = C∗µ, k = κ
and f set to c 7→ Rerand(pk, c). uunionsq
4 Application to some FHE schemes
We now apply our technique to LWE-based schemes built upon Regev’s
encryption scheme [Reg09]. These include the schemes following the de-
signs of [BV11a] and [GSW13]. We comment practical aspects for HE-
lib [HS] and FHEW [DM].
Our technique can also be applied to Gentry’s original scheme and
its variants [Gen09a,Gen09b,Gen10,SV10,SS10]. It may also be applied
to the FHE scheme “based on the integers” of van Dijk et al. [DGHV10]
and its improvements (see [CS15] and references therein).
4.1 Rerandomizing a Regev ciphertext
We let LWEqs(µ, η) denote the set of LWE-encryptions of µ ∈ M under
key sk = s ∈ Znq with modulus q and error rate less than η, i.e., the set
LWEqs(µ, η) =
{
(a, 〈a, s〉+ µ · bq/2c+ e) ∈ Zn+1q such that |e| < ηq
}
.
One may recover µ from an element (c1, c2) from LWEqs(µ, η) by looking
at the most significant bit of c2−〈c1, s〉 mod q. Correctness of decryption
is ensured up to η < 1/4.
We assume that the public key pk contains ` = O(n log q) encryptions
of 0, called rerandomizers:
∀i ≤ `, ri = (ai, bi = 〈a, s〉+ ei) ∈ LWEqs(0, η).
We also assume that the ai’s are uniform and independent (they have
been freshly sampled).
For a ciphertext c ∈ LWEqs(µ, η), we may now define
Rerand(pk, c) = c+
∑
i
εiri + (0, f),
where the εi’s are uniformly and independently sampled from {0,±1}, and
f is sampled uniformly in an interval [−B,B] for some B to be chosen
below. By an appropriate version of the leftover hash lemma (see, e.g.,
[Reg09, Section 5]), writing
c′ = c+
∑
i
εiri = (a′, 〈a′, s〉+ µbq/2c+ e′),
we know that a′ is (within exponentially small distance from) uniform
in Znq , independently of c. That is, the only information about c contained
in c′ is carried by e′ (and plaintext µ). Additionally, we have that |e′| <
(`+ 1) · η · q.
To conclude, it remains to remark that for any x, y ∈ [−(`+1)ηq, (`+
1)ηq], we have:
∆
(
x+ U([−B,B]), y + U([−B,B])) ≤ (`+ 1)ηq
B
=: δ.
Therefore, for any c0, c1 ∈ LWEqs(µ, η), it holds that
∆
(
Rerand(pk, c0),Rerand(pk, c1)
) ≤ δ,
and that
Rerand(pk, c0),Rerand(pk, c1) ∈ LWEqs
(
µ,
(δ + 1)B
q
)
.
To ensure the correctness of decryption after rerandomization, we may
set the parameters so that (δ + 1)B/q < 1/4.
4.2 Application to FHE à la [BV11a]
For simplicity, we only present the case of the (non-ring) LWE-based FHE
scheme of [BV11a].
Let us first recall how an FHE scheme is bootstrapped from a given
SHE scheme. Assume the SHE scheme supports the homomorphic eval-
uation of any (binary) circuit of multiplicative depth f , and that the
decryption operation can be implemented by a circuit of multiplicative
depth g < f . The SHE scheme is bootstrapped to an FHE scheme using
the Refresh function, and evaluates sub-circuit of depth f−g ≥ 1 between
each refreshing procedure.
The construction of the SHE from [BV11a] is made more efficient by
the use of modulus switching. This induces a leveled ciphertext-space:
for each i ≤ f , the ciphertext space Ci is LWEqis (·, η) for a sequence of
q0 > q1 > · · · > qf and a fixed η < 1/4.
The modulus switching technique allows, without any key material, to
map LWEqs(µ, η) to LWEq
′
s (µ, η′) where η′ = η+n ·(log n)O(1)/q′ (or even
η +
√
n · (log n)O(1)/q′ allowing up to negligible probability of incorrect
computation).
By sequentially applying so-called ciphertext tensoring, key switching
and modulus switching steps, one may compute—given appropriate key
material—a ciphertext c′′ ∈ LWEqi+1s (µµ′, η) from two ciphertexts c ∈
LWEqis (µ, η) and c′ ∈ LWEqis (µ′, η), on the condition that qi+1/qi ≥ n ·
(log n)O(1).
Technically, the Refresh function may only be applied to ciphertext
c ∈ Cf , as the naive decryption of ciphertexts with a large modulus
qi > qf could require larger multiplicative depth. To extend Refresh over
the whole ciphertext space, one can switch the modulus to the last level
beforehand, which, for appropriate parameters qi’s does not affect the
error bound.
Instantiating Rerand. Let Cgµ = LWE
qg
s (µ, η). Then, according to the
description above, we have C∗µ = Refresh(pk,Cµ) ⊆ Cgµ. We use the Rerand
function described in Section 4.1, with q = qg.
To ensure the correctness of the whole scheme, it suffices that
(η(`+ 1) +B/qg) + n(logn)O(1)/qf < 1/4.
Setting B ≥ 2η(` + 1)qg, η < 1/(8(` + 1)) and qf ≥ 8n1+o(1) allows to
fulfill the conditions of Theorem 3.3 for some δ ≤ 1/2.
A larger gap qf/qg > nf−g is beneficial to our sanitizing technique, as
it allows one to choose δ ≈ 1/nf−g−1, and therefore decrease the length κ
of the washing program: soaking in a large bucket makes the soak-spin-
repeat program shorter. A striking example is given below.
Application to HElib. It turns out that the parameters given in the
bootstrappable version of HElib [HS15] lead to κ = 1 or 2, which means
that, in this setting, the flooding strategy is, or almost is, already appli-
cable. Indeed, choosing for example the set of parameters corresponding
to n = φ(m) = 16384, we have f = 22 and f −g = 10. The parameters qf
and qg are not given, yet it is typical to have qi+1/qi =
√
n · (log n)O(1)
(guaranteeing correctness only with probability 1−n−ω(1)). We can there-
fore assume that a single soaking step may achieve δ ≤ n/√nf−g ≈
2−14·10/2+14 = 2−56. This gives, according to [HS15] a batch sanitization
procedure of 720 ciphertexts in 500 to 1000 seconds with the current soft-
ware [HS15,HS] (on an IntelX5570 processor at 2.93GHz, with a single
thread).
4.3 Application to FHEW
Because the constructions à la [BV11a] rely on the hardness of LWE with
inverse noise rate 2(logn)c for some c > 1 in theory (and necessarily larger
than
√
n
f ≈ 214·22/2 = 2154 in practice), it is not so surprising that the
implementations allow to straightforwardly apply the flooding strategy
in practice (which theoretically requires assuming the hardness of LWE
with inverse noise rate 2
√
n). It is therefore more interesting to study our
sanitization strategy for FHE schemes based on the hardness of LWE
with inverse polynomial noise rates [GSW13,BV14,AP14], in particular
the concrete instantiation FHEW proposed in [DM15]. For comparison,
the security of this scheme is based on a (Ring)-LWE problem [LPR10]
with inverse noise rate ≈ 232.
Warning. The following analysis is only given as an attempt to estimate
the practical cost of our technique, yet the application with the original
parameters of FHEW is not to be considered secure. Indeed, for efficiency
purposes, the authors [DM15] have chosen to guarentee correctness only
heuristically, and with a rather large failure probability ≈ 2−45. Because
decryption correctness is essential in our argument (see remark at the end
of Section 3.1), a serious implementation should first revise the parameters
to provably ensure decryption correctness with higher probability.
Sanitizing FHEW. We proceed to modify the original scheme recalled
in Figure 1 to implement the sanitizing strategy, as described in Figure 2.
This scheme uses two plaintext moduli t = 2, 4, and this extends the
definition of LWE ciphertexts as follows.
LWEt:qs (µ, η) =
{
(a, 〈a, s〉+ µ · bq/tc+ e) ∈ Zn+1q such that |e| < ηq
}
.
Correct decryption now requires η < q/(2t). The scheme uses two LWE
dimensions: dimension n = 500 for a first secret vector s, and dimen-
sion N = 1024 for a second secret vector z. It also switches between
two ciphertext moduli q = 29 and Q = 232. According to the analysis
from [DM15], the parameters allow to securely encrypt in dimension N
and modulus Q, with a (discrete) Gaussian error of standard deviation
ς = 1.4.
LWE4:qs (µ1, 1/16)
LWE4:qs (µ2, 1/16)
Hom. NAND LWE
2:q
s (µ, 1/4)
LWE4:Qz (µ, E1)
Hom. acc. operations
LWE4:Qs (µ, E2)
Key switch
LWE4:qs (µ, 1/16)
Modulus switch
Fig. 1. Original cycle of FHEW
LWE2:qs (µ, 1/4) LWE2:Qz (µ, η)
Hom. acc. op.
LWE2:Qz (µ, η +B/Q+ )
Rerand
LWE2:Qs (µ, η +B/Q+ ′)
Key switch
LWE2:qs (µ, 1/4)
Modulus switch
Fig. 2. Washing cycle for FHEW. The only internal modification required is setting
u = Q/4 + 1 instead of Q/8 + 1. See [DM15] for more details.
Following the heuristic central-limit estimate of [DM15], the first step
of Figure 2 (i.e., the homomorphic accumulator operations) returns a
ciphertext with a Gaussian-like error of standard deviation ≈ 218, so that
error is of magnitude less than Qη = 221 (with probability ≥ 1 − 2−45).
Also, the choice ς = 1.4 makes the error introduced by the key switch
negligible. Similarly, the re-randomization of the a part of the ciphertext
c = (a, b) using fresh encryption of 0 with error parameter ς given in
the public-key ensure that (with notation similar than in the previous
section) b = Qη +Qε where ε is small compared to η.
Not having to compute any NAND also improves the error tolerance
from 1/16 to 1/4. We may, in return, introduce a soaking noise of pa-
rameter B such that Bq/Q ≈ 3q/16, that is B ≈ 229. This results in
δ = b/B ≈ 2−8.
In conclusion, setting κ between 8 and 16 (depending on the desired
security level) should suffice to achieve appropriate statistical sanitation.
This gives sanitization of a single ciphertext in 5 to 10 seconds with the
current software [DM] (on an unspecified Intel processor at 3Ghz, with a
single thread).
5 Conclusion and open problems
We have shown that both in theory and in practice, the sanitization of
FHE ciphertexts can be performed at a reasonable cost and without sub-
stantial modification of current schemes. It remains that FHE is too slow
for many real world scenarios and SHE is often much preferable. In a
credible scenario where the circuit to evaluate is shallow, with potentially
many inputs but few outputs, the best strategy may be to use HElib in
SHE mode for the main computation, and sanitizing the final result using
FHEW.
When applied to circuit privacy, our approach only provides pas-
sive (honest-but-curious) security. Standard (interactive or not) zero-
knowledge proofs help prevent malicious attackers using fake public keys
and/or fake ciphertexts. Yet ad-hoc techniques surely need to be devel-
oped: with public key size of several gigabytes, the statement to be proved
is gigantic.
A worthy remark toward this goal, is that malicious ciphertexts are
easily tackled once the honest generation of the public key has been es-
tablished. Indeed, a single Refresh operation on each input ciphertexts
will ensure that they are in the subset of valid ciphertexts (formally prov-
ing such statement using, e.g., the circuit privacy definition of [OPP14]
is rather direct). This strategy may effectively reduce interactivity in se-
cure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols based on FHE, and offer
amortization of an initial zero-knowledge proof on the public key.
Ciphertext sanitizability may have further applications in MPC based
on FHE, or, more precisely, based on Threshold FHE. Threshold FHE is
a variant of FHE in which 1- several parties can execute a key generation
protocol to generate a common public key and secret key shares, and 2-
to decrypt, the parties execute a decryption protocol using their secret
key shares. It is theoretically possible to generically convert any FHE
into a Threshold FHE, but this is too cumbersome for practical use: in
particular, it results in a significant number of communication rounds. In-
stead, Threshold FHE schemes have been designed directly by modifying
existing FHE schemes [AJL+12,LTV12,CLO+13,CM15,MW15], eventu-
ally allowing for MPC in two communication rounds [MW15]. A crucial
security property of Threshold FHE, called simulatability of partial de-
cryptions, is that the partial decryptions obtained by individual users do
not reveal anything about the confidential data of the other users. Ci-
phertext sanitization may help enforce this property without resorting to
noise flooding.
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